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I. INTRODUCTION
The Charlottesville tragedy illustrates how the First and Fourth Amendments
can collide during arrests. 1 On August 12, 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia,
white supremacists orchestrated a “Unite the Right” rally to protest the city’s
removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. 2 Anti-racist
demonstrators also attended the rally to oppose the message of white supremacy. 3
Inevitably, the two sides clashed. 4 Violence erupted between the groups, and
the city declared a state of emergency at 11:28 a.m. that day. 5 At 1:42 p.m., one
of the Unite the Right protestors drove his car into a group of anti-racist
demonstrators, killing one person and injuring others.6
The media later criticized the Charlottesville police department for its
perceived slow response to a rapidly-evolving emergency.7 Such criticism forgets
that law enforcement officers face a guessing game about the right moment to
infringe on speech, if at all, especially during a time when violence at protests is
becoming more common. 8 With competing interests at stake—life and death
versus freedom of speech—police may always face criticism, either for being too
heavy-handed or not heavy-handed enough.9
Bright-line Fourth Amendment principles grant police officers great
discretion to enforce laws. 10 For example, most people, if not all, break the law at
some point in their lives, even if just by jaywalking or driving 5 miles per hour

1. See Charlottesville Attack: What, Where and Who?, AL JAZEERA NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/charlottesville-attack-170813081045115.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the timeline of events during the Charlottesville tragedy).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Peter Hermann, Joe Heim & Ellie Silverman, Police in Charlottesville Criticized for Slow Response to
Violent Demonstrations, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ctcharlottesville-police-response-20170812-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Martin Kaste, Police Struggle to Balance Public Safety with Free Speech During Protests, NPR (Aug.
26, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/26/546167516/police-struggle-to-balance-public-safety-with-free-speec
h-during-protests (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
9. Id.; Hermann, Heim &Silverman, supra note 7.
10. Katherine Grace Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the Pretext of
Probable Cause, 51 GA. L. REV. 607, 614 (2017).
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over the speed limit. 11 Of course, officers do not make arrests every time they see
violations, but they retain discretion to do so.12 While this discretionary power is
vital to effective law enforcement, it also has the potential for abuse if officers
make arrests for improper reasons. 13
One such improper reason is a First Amendment retaliatory arrest, which is a
pretextual arrest to retaliate against a person’s constitutionally protected speech. 14
In most retaliatory arrest cases, the underlying criminal charges are never brought
or eventually dropped. 15 Thus, a civil remedy serves a dual purpose: it is an
individual’s only real chance at recourse, and it provides a check on government
actions that might otherwise chill speech without consequence. 16
Though the retaliatory arrest cause of action seems straightforward, a
majority of courts impose a daunting threshold requirement—to bring a
retaliatory arrest claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove a lack of probable
cause.17 In other words, if probable cause for any crime existed at the time of the
arrest, a plaintiff cannot recover even if the police officer’s desire to retaliate
against the speaker was the true reason for the arrest. 18
This harsh result stems from a constitutional tug of war between the First and
Fourth Amendment. 19 At its core, a retaliatory arrest is a First Amendment claim
because the plaintiff seeks redress for a free speech violation.20 But the Fourth
Amendment governs arrests.21 In this unique constitutional collision, probable
cause—a low, malleable, and objective standard that officers wield with
significant discretion under deferential Fourth Amendment rules—can defeat
fiercely-protected First Amendment rights. 22 The majority approach to the

11. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 557–58 (1997); Katherine Grace Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory
Arrests and the Pretext of Probable Cause, 51 G A. L. REV. 607, 614 (2017).
12. Howard, supra note 10, at 614.
13. David Weisburd & Rosann Greenspan, Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of Authority: Findings from a
National Study, NAT’L INST. OF ›JUSTICE 11 (May 2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/18131
2.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. Howard, supra note 10, at 611.
15. See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 661 (2012) (dismissing charges against plaintiff based
on a complete lack of evidence).
16. See Randolph A. Robinson, Policing the Police: Protecting Civil Remedies in Cases of Retaliatory
Arrest, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 499, 499–501 (2012) (explaining that Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are
mechanisms for imposing civil liability on a state actor who violates an individual’s constitutional rights).
17. See, e.g., Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 119 (4th Cir. 2017); Abeyta v. City of New York, 588
Fed. App’x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2014); Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016); McCabe v. Parker,
608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2010)(imposing a no-probable-cause requirement for retaliatory arrest claims).
18. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 670–72 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (warning that only entirely “baseless arrests”
will give rise to civil liability if retaliatory arrest claims are subject to a no-probable-cause requirement).
19. Howard, supra note 10, at 616.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See infra Part V.
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retaliatory arrest analysis ignores the First Amendment rights at stake, and
instead, starts and ends with probable cause. 23
Therefore, in the majority of jurisdictions, officers have total discretion to
enforce laws that silence speech, regardless of how minor the infraction or how
important the message. 24 The practical advantage of this police-friendly rule is to
prevent tragedies like Charlottesville from occurring by allowing police to make
on-the-spot decisions based on probable cause without fear of civil liability. 25
This Comment argues the current landscape for police civil liability does not
properly balance protecting First Amendment rights and deferential Fourth
Amendment rules.26
Ideally, courts should review claims of pretext on a case-by-case basis to root
out officers’ actual motivations for making arrests. 27 Courts have thus far resisted
doing so, likely because “the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt.” 28
Instead, courts have accepted that people often act based on multiple, sometimes
conflicting, motivations. 29 This is especially true with police officers making
decisions under pressure, 30 where “realistically, a judge, forced to divine a police
officer’s motivations, is likely to give the officer the benefit of the doubt.” 31
Still, courts should check police power to restrain speech with a level of
scrutiny that considers First Amendment concerns rather than let Fourth
Amendment principles overpower.32 Courts should not bar retaliatory arrest
claims due to the mere existence of probable cause; courts should scrutinize those
claims on a case-by-case basis even if the “hunt” is challenging. 33
Retaliatory arrests present an impasse between constitutional doctrines that
calls for a compromise. 34 Part II of this Comment discusses how the retaliatory
arrest calculus differs from that of ordinary retaliation claims. 35 Part III explains
how Fourth Amendment principles currently dominate the retaliatory arrest
analysis.36 Part IV examines why First Amendment scrutiny is absent from
retaliatory arrest claims, despite those claims being rooted in the First

23. Howard, supra note 10, at 634.
24. Robinson, supra note 16, at 505 (discussing the existing circuit split).
25. Kaste, supra note 8 (explaining that police officers struggle to strike the right balance when arresting
protestors).
26. See infra Part V.
27. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 38 (6th ed.).
28. Id. (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U L. REV. 785, 786 (1970)).
29. Id.
30. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
31. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 27, at 38.
32. Howard, supra note 10, at 634, 636.
33. Id. at 636.
34. Id. at 638–39.
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part III.
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Amendment.37 Part V argues that no existing test adequately protects both
constitutional interests. 38 Part VI suggests a totality-of-the-circumstances
compromise for retaliatory arrests that weighs the silenced speech against the
probable cause that led to the arrest on a case-by-case basis.39
II. THE RETALIATORY FRAMEWORK
In an ordinary retaliation claim, courts use the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting
test to root out the real motives for government action. 40 A prima facie case
requires a plaintiff to prove the following elements: (1) the speech was
constitutionally protected; (2) the defendant caused an injury that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that constitutionally protected
speech; and (3) plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected speech
substantially motivated the defendant’s actions. 41 Upon the plaintiff’s satisfactory
showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant who must rebut by proving “by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . . .
even in the absence of the protected conduct.” 42
Part A of this section explains how the Supreme Court veered from the Mt.
Healthy test in retaliatory prosecutions by adding a no-probable-cause
requirement.43 Then, Part B posits whether the no-probable-cause-requirement
extends to retaliatory arrests based on subsequent Supreme Court precedent and
lower court interpretations. 44
A. The No-Probable-Cause Requirement in Retaliatory Prosecutions
In Hartman v. Moore, the Supreme Court shifted away from the Mt. Healthy
test by injecting probable cause as an element of retaliatory prosecution 45 A
retaliatory prosecution occurs when a prosecutor allegedly brings charges to
retaliate against an individual’s speech.46 In Hartman, for example, Moore
lobbied members of Congress to force the United States Postal Service (“USPS”)
to adopt multiline scanners, a product built by Moore’s company. 47 USPS

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VIV.
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
547 U.S. 250, 252, 265–66 (2006).
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252–53.
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opposed Moore’s efforts because it preferred using single-line scanners.48
After Moore prevailed in his lobbying efforts, the USPS launched an
investigation into the company, and an Assistant United States Attorney brought
criminal charges against Moore for alleged kickbacks. 49 However, the district
court eventually acquitted Moore based on a “complete lack of direct evidence”
of any wrongdoing. 50 Moore brought a Bivens action, stating the prosecutor
violated his First Amendment rights by bringing charges as retaliation for
lobbying against the USPS. 51
The Supreme Court rejected Moore’s retaliation claim because probable
cause supported the prosecution. 52 The Court was particularly wary of the
causation problem in the prosecution context. 53 Prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity for charging decisions, and there is also a strong presumption of
prosecutorial regularity that shields their actions from judicial inspection. 54 As a
consequence, a plaintiff cannot sue the prosecutor in a retaliatory prosecution
claim; instead, the defendant must be a third person with a retaliatory motive who
allegedly induced the prosecutor to bring charges. 55
The causation problem, then, is that a plaintiff must prove that someone other
than the prosecutor caused the retaliatory prosecution. 56 This causal gap between
the two actors—one with the intent and one who took action—is especially
challenging in the presence of probable cause. 57 Probable cause gives a
prosecutor legitimate grounds to bring charges, independent of third-party
motives.58 Essentially, the Hartman Court’s solution amounted to a heightened
pleading standard: a plaintiff must plead and prove a lack of probable cause at the
outset because probable cause irreparably muddies the waters of causation59
Importantly, the Hartman Court understood that probable cause is not
dispositive.60 The Court knew a no-probable-cause requirement would leave
some retaliatory prosecutions unchecked, but apparently the Court was willing to
accept that fact.61 It stated that while it would prefer direct evidence of retaliatory
intent or inducement, such evidence would be “rare and consequently poor

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 261–63.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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guides in structuring a cause of action.” 62 Thus, in the face of complexity, the
Court chose simplicity. 63
B. Does the No-Probable-Cause Requirement Extend to Retaliatory Arrests?
Both before and after Hartman, lower courts split on whether the noprobable-cause requirement applied to retaliatory arrests.64 The majority
approach currently bars retaliatory arrest claims if probable cause existed for the
underlying arrest. 65 The bright-line Fourth Amendment rule that probable cause
is a presumptively constitutional reason for an arrest seems to underlie this
approach.66 In contrast, only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits currently allow claims
to proceed despite the existence of probable cause. 67 Those courts hold that
Hartman’s rationale is unique to prosecutions and does not apply to arrests,
primarily due to the lack of a causal gap between two actors. 68
In 2012, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the circuit split in
Reichle v. Howards.69 In Reichle, Secret Service agents overheard the plaintiff
making hostile comments about Vice President Richard Cheney’s policies during
a public appearance at a mall. 70 The agents then witnessed the plaintiff confront
the Vice President and touch his shoulder as he walked away. 71 The agents
arrested the plaintiff for harassment, though the prosecutor dismissed the
charges.72
Later, the plaintiff alleged that the agents arrested him as a pretext to silence
his speech in violation of the First Amendment. 73 The matter eventually reached
the Supreme Court. 74 When the matter eventually reached the Supreme Court,
rather than answer the question on certiorari, the Court instead resolved the case
62. Id. at 264; The same can be said for arrests. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 27, at 38(“Even
the most truthful officer may be unable to testify with certainty . . . and a dishonest officer has a strong incentive
to perjure himself.”).
63. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264–66.
64. See John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 755, 773, 775 (2009) (explaining the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits adopted the no-probable-cause requirement; the Ninth and Tenth Circuits rejected it; and the other
courts have not touched on the question).
65. Id. at 775.
66. Id. at 774; Howard, supra note 10, at 614–15.
67. Koerner, supra note 64, at 775.
68. See Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1234 (9th Cir. 2006) (allowing retaliatory arrest
claims to proceed despite the existence of probable cause).
69. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663 (analyzing whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim may lie
despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest).
70. Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 660–61.
72. Id. at 661.
73. Id. at 662.
74. Id. at 663.
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by granting the officers qualified immunity due to its reluctance to unnecessarily
decide constitutional issues.75 The Court held that due to the circuit split and
Hartman decision, the law on retaliatory arrests was not clearly established
enough to impose liability on the agents.76
Within its determination, the Court mentioned similarities between arrests
and prosecutions that may be relevant for deciding the constitutional issue in a
future case. 77 First, the Court noted it “has never recognized a right to be free
from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.” 78 Indeed, the
majority of lower courts post-Reichle have cited this language as the Supreme
Court’s approval of extending Hartman’s rule to arrests because there is no
protected right at stake. 79
Second, the Court stated that arrests, like prosecutions, also present a
“tenuous causal connection.”80 The Court admitted that the causal gap is not
identical because an arresting officer, unlike a prosecutor, is not entirely immune
from liability.81 Therefore, the plaintiff can sue the officer directly, appearing to
leave a simplified causal chain because the arresting officer will often be the
person both harboring the retaliatory intent and initiating the arrest. 82
As the Reichle Court hinted, arrests are not always simple; multiple actors
may be involved in an arrest, and outside parties can induce an officer to make an
arrest.83 For example, in 2014 a man parodied the mayor of Peoria, Illinois on
Twitter, insinuating that the mayor was involved in unethical, immoral, and
criminal behavior.84 Eventually, police raided the man’s apartment and arrested
him for “impersonating a public official.”85 The man sued the City of Peoria
claiming police arrested him due to outside pressure from the mayor or his
supporters to shut down his Twitter page. 86 The parties settled out of court, but it
shows how third parties can feasibly induce officers to arrest disliked speakers
the same way third parties might induce a prosecutor to bring charges. 87

75. Id. at 663–64.
76. Id. at 670.
77. Id. at 667.
78. Id. at 664–65.
79. See, e.g., Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 119 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Reichle to justify applying a
no-probable-cause rule to arrests).
80. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668.
81. Id. at 668–69.
82. Id.
83. See generally Dawn Rhodes, Police Raid Over Fake Twitter Account Costs Peoria $125,000, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-twitter-peoria-mayor-lawsuit20150902-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing a situation where
multiple actors, who were not law enforcement officers, contributed to an arrest).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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The Reichle Court itself pointed out at least one other way an arrest can have
complex causation: when an officer arrests someone based on a “wholly
legitimate consideration of speech.” 88 According to the Court, speech can
properly trigger an arrest when it supplies probable cause or evidence of a
threat.89
The Reichle Court cited Wayte v. United States as an example. 90 In Wayte, a
young man failed to register with the Selective Service as the law mandated.91
The man also wrote letters to the government expressing his intent not to
register.92 Upon his indictment, the Court used the man’s own speech against
him: “The letters written to Selective Service provided strong, perhaps
conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to comply—one of the
elements of the offense.” 93 Technically, police arrested the man partly because
of his protected speech, yet the Reichle Court implied the Wayte arrest did not
rise to the level of retaliation. 94
The Reichle Court’s suggestion that even arrests can have complex causation
echoes the Hartman Court’s underlying causation concern: “Some degree of bad
motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been
taken anyway.”95 In other words, probable cause complicates causation .96 Just as
probable cause is an independently legitimate reason for a prosecutor to bring
charges, probable cause is also a legitimate reason for an officer to make an
arrest.97 Therefore, under deferential Fourth Amendment principles, probable
cause outweighs any alleged retaliatory motive that concurrently may have
contributed to the arrest.98
Under the current framework, retaliatory prosecution claims have a noprobable-cause requirement after Hartman.99 It is not clear whether the noprobable-cause requirement extends to retaliatory arrests because the Supreme
Court left the question open in Reichle, but most lower courts extend the
Hartman rule to retaliatory arrests in the absence of further guidance by the

88. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 668.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 612–13 (1985)).
91. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 601.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 612–13.
94. Howards, 566 U.S. at 668 (considering speech is proper when it goes to an element of a crime).
95. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260 (emphasis added).
96. See id. at 263 (explaining “the distinct problem of causation” in retaliatory prosecution claims is
showing that a prosecutor with legitimate grounds to bring charges did not do so for legitimate reasons).
97. See id. (explaining “the distinct problem of causation” in retaliatory prosecution claims is showing
that a prosecutor with legitimate grounds to bring charges did not do so for legitimate reasons).
98. Howard, supra note 10, 616, 636.
99. See supra Part II.A (discussing Hartman’s holding that a no-probable-cause requirement applies to
retaliatory prosecution claims).
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Supreme Court.100
III. THE OVERPOWERING INFLUENCE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
AND Q UALIFIED IMMUNITY ON RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS
A retaliatory arrest may implicate First Amendment rights, but the Fourth
Amendment ultimately governs arrests.101 The Supreme Court prefers bright-line
Fourth Amendment rules because case-by-case determinations risk turning
“every discretionary judgment in the field . . . into an occasion for constitutional
review.”102
Part A explores how courts that impose a no-probable-cause requirement to
retaliatory arrest claims rely on Fourth Amendment precedent rather than First
Amendment concerns.103 And those courts typically use a matter-of-fact approach
for doing so with little explanation. 104 Further, Part B then reveals how most
courts, including the Supreme Court, opt to grant officers qualified immunity
instead of deciding retaliatory arrest claims on the merits, which caters to
overarching Fourth Amendment principles of granting deference to law
enforcement whenever possible. 105
A. Fourth Amendment Concerns Dominate the Retaliatory Arrest Analysis
The strength of deferential Fourth Amendment rules is evident, and the
Supreme Court seems to have accepted that those rules may, at times, adversely
affect individual freedoms. 106 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, police officers
arrested a plaintiff for a seatbelt violation.107 The plaintiff argued that an arrest
for such a minor infraction was unreasonable and violated her Fourth
Amendment rights.108 Further, she asked the Court to establish a new test that
100. The Supreme Court recently left the question open yet again. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138
S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (2018) (“[W]hether in a retaliatory arrest case the Hartman approach should apply . . . [or] the
inquiry should be governed only by Mt. Healthy is a determination that must await a different case.”). In
Lozman, the plaintiff alleged that the City ordered his arrest for criticizing public officials during an open city
council meeting pursuant to an official retaliatory policy. Id. The Court noted that the plaintiff’s claim was “far
afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim” and abolished the Hartman rule in favor of the Mt. Healthy test
only in the narrow circumstances presented. Id. For the “mine run of arrests,” however, the no-probable-cause
debate is still unresolved. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
102. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
103. Infra Part III.A.
104. See infra Part III.A.
105. See infra Part III.B.
106. Arnold H. Loewy, Cops Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 S T. JOHN’S L. REV. 535,
560 (2002) (“[T]he Arrest of Ms. Atwater, though considered individually unreasonable, was held to be
constitutionally reasonable.”).
107. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324.
108. Id. at 325.
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would forbid “custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when conviction could
not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling
need for immediate detention.”109
The Court rejected her argument and held that an officer can properly arrest
when he has probable cause that even a minor crime has been committed in his
presence.110 The Court’s rationale was that forcing officers to balance public
against private interests on a case-by-case basis would be unworkable and create
a “systematic disincentive to arrest.” 111 The Court decided that, for Fourth
Amendment cases, “[m]ultiplied many times over, the costs to society of such
underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being
needlessly arrested and booked.” 112 Thus, the Court has shown that it is willing to
sacrifice individual rights to give way to bright-line rules that guide officers’
actions.113 The theme of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is often administrative
efficiency.114
This concept also appeared in Whren v. United States.115 In Whren, a police
officer pulled over a group of African American men for multiple traffic
violations.116 The men argued that the stop was a pretext for racial discrimination,
and they advocated for a “reasonable officer” standard. 117 Under the defendants’
proposed standard, the test for arrests would be “whether a police officer, acting
reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given,” not whether
probable cause existed. 118
The Supreme Court was not sympathetic. 119 It criticized the reasonable
officer standard as a subjective test disguised as an objective test because it
would ultimately turn on whether the police officer’s state of mind drove him to
deviate from usual police practices. 120 The Court also remarked that such a test,
which aimed to “plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement,” would
worsen evidentiary difficulties associated with proving intent.121 Finally, the
109. Id. at 346.
110. Id. at 354.
111. Id. at 351 (“But we have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is
not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determination of government need, lest every
discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 350 (“[The Plaintiff’s] rule therefore would not only place police in an almost impossible spot
but would guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would occur.”).
115. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
116. Id. at 808.
117. Id. at 809.
118. Id. at 810.
119. Id. at 819 (holding the traffic stop was reasonable and affirming the convictions).
120. Id. at 814.
121. Id. at 814–15 (“While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide objective
assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical
constable—an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity.”).
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Court also noted that police practices vary depending on the locale, and the
Fourth Amendment should not apply differently between jurisdictions. 122 For all
these reasons, the Whren Court held that, so long as there was probable cause for
the stop, the arrest was lawful regardless of the officer’s alleged bad motive. 123
The defendants argued that cunning officers could inevitably conjure up
probable cause for anyone because of the panoply of available laws. 124 The Court
acknowledged this concern, but stated it was ill-suited to decide the merits of
enforcing some laws over others.125 Further the Court may simply not be overly
concerned about pretextual stops because the issue is not litigated very often. 126
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to burden officers with an added
mental balancing test when probable cause to arrest clearly exists.127 In Virginia
v. Moore, officers arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license, a
misdemeanor violation that required a citation rather than an arrest under
Virginia law.128 Although the officer violated state law by making the arrest, the
state law did not allow for suppression of evidence. 129 Instead, the defendant
attempted to suppress evidence based on Fourth Amendment principles. 130 He
argued that because state law prevented officers from arresting for minor crimes,
his arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.131
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding the state law was at
odds with Fourth Amendment principles giving officers discretion to arrest for
any crime, felony or misdemeanor alike. 132 In so holding, the Court reemphasized
“the need for a bright-line constitutional standard” based on its concern about
officers facing difficult judgment calls during arrests. 133
In sum, the Supreme Court’s steady preference for bright-line Fourth
Amendment rules is illustrated by its distaste for more complicated tests. 134 It
rejected Atwater’s attempt to draw lines between misdemeanors and felonies. 135

122. Id. at 815.
123. Id. at 819 (“For the run-of-the-mine case . . . there is no realistic alternative to the traditional
common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”).
124. Id. at 818.
125. Id. at 818–19.
126. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (stating the country is not facing an epidemic of minor offense
arrests); see also Hartman, 547 U.S. at 258–59 (rejecting the argument that there will be a flood of litigation in
retaliatory prosecution claims).
127. See generally Va. v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (concluding that the burden on officers must not
be too high because of the challenges officers face in the field).
128. Id. at 166–67.
129. Id. at 167.
130. Id. at 168.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id. at 175.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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It rejected Whren’s reasonable officer standard. 136 And it rejected Moore’s state
law-based balancing test. 137 In the retaliatory arrest context, allowing claims to
proceed despite probable cause would arguably force officers to use a balancing
test for arrests whenever speech is involved. 138 In that sense, the widespread
acceptance of the no-probable-cause requirement is understandable because it
appears most loyal to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent. 139
B. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine Bolsters Fourth Amendment Dominance
Qualified immunity is yet another protection for law enforcement officers. 140
It attaches when an official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”141
In White v. Pauly, the Court reinforced the qualified immunity doctrine. 142 In
White, Officer White arrived late at the scene where police were ordering a
suspect to exit his home. 143 Officer White heard the suspect yell, “We have
guns,” and then the suspect shot at officers and pointed a handgun in the
direction of Officer White, who was protected by a large stone.144 Officer White
emerged from behind the stone, then shot and killed the suspect. 145
The question before the Supreme Court was whether Officer White was
entitled to qualified immunity because he used deadly force without first warning
the victim.146 The Court reversed the lower court and granted Officer White
qualified immunity, holding that, to be clearly established, the law at issue must
be “particularized” to the factual scenario. 147 This means officers will escape
liability using the qualified immunity defense unless the court already ruled on an
almost identical factual scenario in the past. 148 Thus, even though failure to warn
136. Id. at 172.
137. Id. at 176.
138. See infra Part VI.
139. Redd v. City of Enterprise, 14014 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When a police officer has
probable cause to believe that a person is committing a particular public offense, he is justified in arresting that
person, even if the offender may be speaking at the time that he is arrested.”).
140. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); Howards, 566 U.S. at 664 (analyzing the
qualified immunity doctrine).
141. Id. at 308. (“While this Court’s case law ‘do[es] not require a case directly on point’ for a right to be
clearly established, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.’ In other words, immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’”).
142. 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).
143. Id. at 550.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 552.
148. Id. (stating plaintiff failed to identity a case where an officer faced similar circumstances and was
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before using deadly force constitutes a “run-of-the mill Fourth Amendment
violation,” Officer White was still entitled to qualified immunity because no
previous case was factually similar enough to White’s to clearly establish the law
for that specific scenario. 149 The extreme particularity required to overcome
qualified immunity shows how the Supreme Court continues to diligently shield
officers from liability whenever possible. 150
Reichle is an example of how qualified immunity trumps retaliatory arrest
claims.151 In Reichle, the Court granted Secret Service agents qualified immunity
because the law about retaliatory arrests was not clearly established due to circuit
splits and the confusion caused by the Hartman decision.152 The Reichle Court’s
refusal to resolve the split or to clearly establish whether the no-probable-cause
requirement applies to retaliatory arrests ensures the qualified immunity defense
is still available in retaliatory arrest cases.153
Even in minority circuits that reject the no-probable-cause requirement, the
trend towards qualified immunity reigns. 154 For example, in Skoog v. County of
Clamakas, the plaintiff had a reputation in his community for videotaping and
photographing police officers in the field, and he also was engaged in lawsuits
against the county and police officers challenging his previous DUI arrest. 155
Officers eventually obtained a search warrant based on probable cause for
filming officers without consent, and eleven officers raided the plaintiff’s house,
some with guns drawn. 156 The plaintiff alleged during the raid, an officer
explicitly stated, “People shouldn’t sue cops.”157
The plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing the officers
acted in retaliation for the plaintiff’ exercising his constitutionally protected
speech.158 The Ninth Circuit rejected the no-probable-cause requirement, which
would presumably allow the plaintiff’s claim to proceed, yet the court ultimately
granted the officers qualified immunity despite the officers’ highly questionable
conduct.159

held to have violated the Fourth Amendment).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 551–52 (“In the last five years, this Court has issued a number of opinions reversing federal
courts in qualified immunity cases. The Court has found this necessary both because qualified immunity is
important to ‘society as a whole,’ and because as ‘an immunity from suit,’ qualified immunity ‘is effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’”) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
151. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663.
152. Id. at 670.
153. Id. at 664.
154. See generally Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that qualified
immunity shielded officers from liability in a retaliatory arrest case).
155. Id. at 1225.
156. Id. at 1226–27.
157. Id. at 1227.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1235.
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The judicial tendency to shield law enforcement officers through qualified
immunity echoes the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has given officers
significant discretion. 160 Advocating for allowing retaliatory arrest claims despite
the existence of probable cause is an uphill battle because the position defies the
pervasive trend of shielding police officers from liability. 161 Yet allowing Fourth
Amendment principles to overpower the analysis ignores the fact that retaliatory
arrests are ultimately First Amendment claims. 162
IV. THE NONEXISTENT ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN RETALIATORY
ARREST CLAIMS
None of the First Amendment retaliation tests use the type of scrutiny that
has developed in First Amendment jurisprudence. 163 Part A suggests that this
may be because retaliatory arrests blend speech and unlawful conduct or because
retaliation claims are distinct from substantive constitutional claims. 164 But even
if a normal First Amendment test applied, Part B explains that strict First
Amendment scrutiny may be insufficient to protect speech in a retaliatory arrest
claim.165
A. Why Retaliation Claims are Treated Differently Than Non-Retaliation First
Amendment Claims
Courts do not treat First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims like other types
of First Amendment claims. 166 One explanation may be the inherent difficulty of
separating unlawful conduct from lawful expression. 167 The Supreme Court
discussed this problem in United States v. O’Brien.168 There, the defendant
burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War. 169 Despite his First Amendment
right to protest, the Court held the defendant’s act of burning the draft card was
illegal.170
The Court, concerned about individuals using the First Amendment to shield
otherwise unlawful action, held that unlawful conduct could be restricted, even if
160. See supra Part III.A (discussing the discretion officers enjoy under Fourth Amendment precedent).
161. See e.g., Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1235 (finding that qualified immunity shielded officers from liability in
a retaliatory arrest case).
162. Howard, supra note 10, at 636.
163. Id.
164. See infra Part IV.A.
165. See infra Part IV.B.
166. Howard, supra note 10, at 636.
167. See generally U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (analyzing the distinction between protected
speech and unprotected conduct).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 369.
170. Id.
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that meant incidental limitations on the freedom of expression. 171 Extending
O’Brien’s reasoning suggests that retaliatory arrests might be treated differently
than other speech restrictions because some objectively unlawful conduct is
involved in a retaliatory arrest.172
Another possible reason courts do not use traditional First Amendment
analysis for retaliatory arrest claims may be due to the distinction between
constitutional tort claims and “direct” constitutional claims. 173 It seems the
crucial difference is timing.174 In a First Amendment context, a direct
constitutional violation prevents speech from happening, while a tortious
retaliatory government action punishes past speech. 175 As the Supreme Court
explained, “In the standard retaliation case recognized in our precedent, the
plaintiff has performed some discrete act in the past . . . [t]he plaintiff’s action is
over and done with, and the only question is the defendant’s purpose. . . .” 176
But a retaliatory arrest is more like a direct constitutional violation because
the plaintiff’s speech is not necessarily “over and done with” at the time of the
arrest.177 In Hartman, the prosecutor brought charges long after the plaintiff
completed his lobbying efforts. 178 An officer, in contrast, could arrest a
demonstrator mid-protest.179
For example, after Donald Trump was elected President, the Los Angeles
Police Department (“LAPD”) arrested 462 protestors, mostly for blocking
roadways or failing to disperse. 180 A year later, records showed the LAPD only

171. Id. at 376–77.
When “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms; a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id.
172. Howard, supra note 10, at 614 (explaining bright line rules preserve the ability of law enforcement
to regulate unlawful conduct safely).
173. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 148 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010).
174. Id.
175. Id. (“A retaliation claim is different. It asks not whether the exercise of a right has been
unconstitutionally burdened or inhibited (in other words, survives rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict
scrutiny review), but whether the Government is punishing the plaintiffs for exercising their rights.”) In that
sense, a retaliation claim does not “burden” or “inhibit” speech because the speaker was already able to get his
message out.
176. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 558 n.10 (2007).
177. Id.
178. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 253.
179. James Queally, The LAPD arrested 462 people in anti-Trump protests. Only three were criminally
charged, Times analysis finds, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-lapd-protest-charges-20171102-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
180. Id.
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sought charges in ten of the 462 cases, and prosecutors only filed charges in three
of those ten cases. 181 Further, the Los Angeles City Council approved an
ordinance that places more restrictions on the items protestors may carry,
including limits on the types of signs allowed during protests. 182 This kind of
ordinance could provide officers even more opportunities to silence
demonstrators on-the-spot, so it may not be appropriate to deal with retaliatory
arrests like other retaliation claims. 183
B. Though Retaliatory Arrests Claims are First Amendment Claims, Strict
Scrutiny May Not Be the Appropriate Test
Content- and viewpoint-based speech restrictions are typically subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny because the First Amendment represents “a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”184 To pass strict scrutiny, the government
must prove that a regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest;185 analysts have referred to the test as “strict in theory, fatal in fact,” as
regulations rarely survive. 186
A retaliatory arrest functions as a direct, immediate content- or viewpointbased restriction of speech, yet courts do not test retaliatory arrests with strict
scrutiny.187 This presents a startling discrepancy: judges inspect content-based
speech restrictions under a microscope but shut their eyes to retaliatory arrest
claims so long as there is probable cause for the arrest. 188
Although the Fourth Amendment currently overpowers the First Amendment
in retaliatory arrest claims, a First Amendment takeover is not necessarily the
solution.189 As Justice Blackmun noted:
The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution
. . . Each provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot
subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment
at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
185. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that target
speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).
186. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that the
strict scrutiny test is “strict in theory, fatal in fact” because speech restrictions rarely survive strict scrutiny).
187. Howard, supra note 10, at 635.
188. Id. at 636.
189. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 761 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court.190
Beyond the need to balance other constitutional concerns, like the Fourth
Amendment,191 applying strict scrutiny to retaliatory arrest claims may be
futile.192 A retaliatory arrest may slip through strict scrutiny because law
enforcement is a compelling interest, and arrests are a judicially-approved way
of achieving that interest, whether or not speech is involved. 193 Just as the
Hartman Court hinted, courts face difficulty separating legitimate law
enforcement interests from illegitimate retaliatory motives, and strict scrutiny
does not make the task any easier. 194
V. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF TWO CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES AND LACK OF
ALTERNATIVES
Probable cause permeates Fourth Amendment law. 195 In the Supreme Court’s
opinion, “the rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found [for] safeguard[ing] citizens
from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded
charges of crime [while giving] fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community’s protection.”196
Despite its critical role in Fourth Amendment law, probable cause is an
incompatible threshold requirement for retaliatory arrest claims for several
reasons.197 First, a no-probable-cause requirement creates an objective threshold
to an inherently subjective cause of action. 198 Retaliatory arrest claims hinge on
whether the arresting officer subjectively harbored a retaliatory intent, making it
absurd to bar a subjective claim based on an objective standard. 199
Also, in contrast to strict First Amendment scrutiny, probable cause is a low
standard.200 Loosely defined as “fair probability of a crime,” the Supreme Court
has held that the belief that there is probable cause need not be more true than
false.201 Thus, in a retaliatory arrest case, First Amendment rights, normally
190. Id.
191. See supra Part III.A (discussing the discretion officers enjoy under Fourth Amendment precedent).
192. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (describing the contours of the strict scrutiny test).
193. See supra Part IV.A (discussing how strict scrutiny is unworkable for retaliatory arrest claims).
194. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263 (describing the “factual difficulty of divining” the true source of a
person’s motivations).
195. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227,
243 (1984) (noting that probable cause “lies at the heart” of the Fourth Amendment).
196. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
197. Robinson, supra note 16, at 511, 514–15.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 514.
201. See, e.g., Ill. v. Gates, 642 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Tx. v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (defining
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protected by the strictest judicial scrutiny, can be overcome by something less
than fifty percent accuracy. 202
Finally, probable cause is malleable. 203 If the original source of probable
cause turns out to be insufficient, an officer can point to some other source of
probable cause that may or may not have been in his mind at the time of arrest. 204
In Devenpeck v. Alford, the defendant challenged a finding of probable cause
after an officer arrested him for violating the Washington Privacy Act; 205 the
violation did not amount to a criminal offense. 206 But regardless, the Supreme
Court held that the arrest would be reasonable so long as the officer could point
to some source of probable cause that existed at the time of the arrest, such as
impersonating an officer or obstructing law enforcement, even if the officer did
not cite those other sources as the reason for the arrest. 207 Probable cause’s
malleability cuts against the First Amendment concept that speech restrictions
must be narrowly-tailored.208
Allen v. Cisneros, a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
illustrates the unfairness of imposing probable cause as a threshold requirement
to retaliatory arrest claims and asking the plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of
pleading and proving a lack of probable cause. 209 In Allen, a street preacher
brought a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against officers who arrested
him while he was preaching in the street. 210 The plaintiff alleged that officers
arrested him because he attempted to film the officers’ treatment of him. 211 The
officers argued that the plaintiff was arrested for violating a city ordinance
prohibiting demonstrators from carrying objects more than three-quarters of an
inch thick.212 The preacher carried a shofar, which is a “trumpet-like instrument
made from a ram’s horn . . . used in Judaism to mark the holidays of Rosh
Hashanah and Yom Kippur.”213
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment in
the officers’ favor because the shofar provided probable cause for the violation of
the city ordinance. 214 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit completely blocked the claim
the probable cause standard).
202. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
203. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (rejecting a test that would require probable
cause to be closely related to the offense that motivated the officer at the time of arrest).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 150.
206. Id. at 152.
207. Id. at 153, 156.
208. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
209. 815 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2016).
210. Id. at 241–42.
211. Id. at 242.
212. Id. at 245.
213. Id. at 242 n.1.
214. Id. at 246–47.
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based on a highly technical city ordinance, despite the existence of plausible
evidence pointing to retaliatory motives by the police. 215 Allen exemplifies the
majority approach—in a collision between the First and Fourth Amendments, the
Fourth Amendment prevails. 216
The Supreme Court’s bright-line Fourth Amendment rules may seem harsh,
but Justice Scalia extended an olive branch in Whren.217 He suggested that
although probable cause forecloses a Fourth Amendment claim, an individual
could bring a suit under a different constitutional amendment.218 In Whren, for
example, the defendants could have brought viable Equal Protection claims
because they claimed that police arrested them as a pretext for racial
discrimination. 219 Justice Scalia’s words in Whren are meaningless if courts
foreclose all recourse for a First Amendment violation whenever any probable
cause supports an arrest, but the trouble is finding a method to litigate retaliatory
arrest claims in a way that preserves both the First and Fourth Amendment. 220
The Court has not opined on Justice Scalia’s olive branch since Whren, and
lower courts have applied the concept inconsistently. 221 Oddly, probable cause
does not defeat Equal Protection-based challenges in the very same courts of
appeal that allow probable cause to bar First Amendment claims.222 For instance,
the Eighth Circuit held that an Equal Protection claim “does not require proof
[that the plaintiff] was stopped without probable cause.” 223 Yet that same circuit
imposed the opposite rule for retaliatory arrest claims. 224 It is unclear why courts
treat First and Fourteenth Amendment claims differently, especially because the
Supreme Court has adopted similar tests for both. 225
The Supreme Court stated that Section 1983 “is not itself a source of
substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights

215. Id.
216. Id. at 247 n.8 (finding probable cause trumps a First Amendment claim).
217. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (allowing a section 1983
claim based on the Equal Protection clause to proceed regardless of the existence of probable cause).
222. Id.
223. Id. (“When the claim is selective enforcement of the traffic laws or a racially-motivated arrest, the
plaintiff must normally prove that similarly situated individuals were not stopped or arrested in order to show
the requisite discriminatory effect and purpose.”).
224. See McCabe, 608 F.3d at 1075 (“Lack of probable cause is a necessary element of all the claims
McCabe and Nelson brought arising from the allegedly unlawful arrests.”).
225. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (“Proof
that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not
necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to
the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered”) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).
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elsewhere conferred.”226 Extending that reasoning, Section 1983 analysis should
match the framework that governs the constitutional right allegedly infringed. 227
For example, in an excessive force claim brought under Section 1983, a court
would analyze the claim using the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test as a
guidepost.228
Therefore, because a retaliatory arrest infringes on First Amendment rights,
courts should judge the claims by First Amendment standards, which do not
include a no-probable-cause threshold requirement. 229 Further, First Amendment
scrutiny places the burden on the government, not the individual. 230 But as
mentioned previously, even strict scrutiny is unworkable because the government
can always cite a compelling interest in enforcing laws when there is probable
cause, and the Supreme Court has already granted officers discretion to make
arrests for even the most minor violations. 231
Even the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting test, used for ordinary retaliation
claims, does not strike the proper compromise, which may explain why courts
still default to qualified immunity rather than apply Mt. Healthy to retaliatory
arrest claims.232 The Mt. Healthy test does not protect First Amendment rights
sufficiently because the government can rebut by showing “by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the
absence of the protected conduct.” 233 The preponderance of the evidence standard
is low—it means more likely than not, even if by a minuscule margin. 234 This low
standard provides an escape hatch for officers armed with probable cause. 235
Because probable cause carries such a weighty presumption, it is arguably
dispositive under Mt. Healthy at the expense of First Amendment rights. 236
On the other hand, even if probable cause is not dispositive under Mt.
Healthy, allowing a claim to proceed despite probable cause chips away at Fourth
Amendment principles of officer discretion. 237 Mt. Healthy does not account for
an arrest scenario because it was not a case about criminal procedure; it was a

226. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
227. Id.; Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
228. Id.
229. Howard, supra note 10, at 635.
230. Howard, supra note 10, at 631.
231. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the difficulty of applying strict scrutiny because probable cause
justifies an arrest).
232. See, e.g., Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1235 (finding that even assuming retaliatory motives existed, officer
was entitled to qualified immunity).
233. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 287.
234. John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof, 67 F LA. L.
REV. 1569, 1573 (2015).
235. Howard, supra note 10, at 615.
236. Id.
237. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency protect officer discretion).
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retaliatory termination case. 238 Probable cause is not an impediment to
employment claims, and thus does not consume the analysis as it does in
retaliatory arrest claims. 239 For this reason, even Mt. Healthy does not strike the
proper compromise for retaliatory arrest cases. 240
VI. THE COMPROMISE
The Supreme Court stated, “we know of no principled basis on which to
create a hierarchy of constitutional values.” 241 Retaliatory arrests unavoidably
implicate both the First and Fourth Amendments, and existing tests do not
adequately compromise between the two competing doctrines. 242 However, a
totality-of-the-circumstances test allows for fair consideration of all First and
Fourth Amendment concerns. 243
Technically, police officers are already equipped to consider the totality-ofthe-circumstances in the field, shown by the fact that the probable cause test itself
is a totality-of-the-circumstances test.244 Beyond that, the Supreme Court also
considers the totality-of-the circumstances when deciding whether confessions
are voluntary or warrantless searches are reasonable.245
Although the Court has rejected balancing tests that burden officers on the
scene, it has not entirely foreclosed the need for balancing246 In Whren, the
Supreme Court stated, “[I]n principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it
turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant
factors. With rare exceptions . . . the result of that balancing is not in doubt where
the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.” 247
The Court continued by explaining that those “rare exceptions” which
actually require a balancing test are searches or seizures “unusually harmful to an
individual’s privacy or even physical interests.” 248
238. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 276.
239. Id. at 287 (presenting the Mt. Healthy test, which does not factor in probable cause as it is a
retaliatory termination case).
240. See infra Part VI (setting forth an alternative to the Mt. Healthy standard).
241. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
484 (1982).
242. See supra Part V (analyzing the weaknesses inherent in the Hartman and Mt. Healthy standards).
243. Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (“We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard
will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires
. . . .”).
244. Id. at 230, 238.
245. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (finding that voluntariness in the context
of confessions is judged based on the totality of the circumstances); see also Mo. v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,
156 (2013) (“Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case
by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”).
246. Whren, 517 U.S. at 817.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 818 (“For example, seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry into a home, entry
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A retaliatory arrest should qualify as one of those “rare exceptions” that is
“unusually harmful” to individuals because of the First Amendment rights at
stake and thus should trigger a balancing of all relevant factors. 249 In a retaliatory
arrest context, a totality-of-the-circumstances test would likely include factors
such as the source of probable cause, the severity of the underlying crime, and
any exigencies, weighed against the degree and value of expression inhibited or
affected by the arrest. 250
In a way, a totality-of-the-circumstances test mirrors the Mt. Healthy test
because both parties bear a distinct burden. 251 But rather than allow defendants to
rebut upon a meager showing that, by a preponderance of the evidence, probable
cause existed and motivated the arrest, the Court would need to weigh the
defendant’s evidence of probable cause against plaintiff’s evidence of a
retaliatory motive, with heightened skepticism when political or other core
speech has been affected. 252
Part A discusses how a totality-of-the-circumstances test would factor into
First Amendment concerns 253 and Part B shows how the test would restrain, but
not eliminate, the Fourth Amendment issues at play in a retaliatory arrest. 254
A. First Amendment Concerns Enter the Equation
The Supreme Court generally has no appetite for assessing the value of
speech, but has reluctantly considered the value of speech in the past when
defining the scope of unprotected categories of speech. 255 For instance, the Court
carved out an exception to otherwise unprotected obscenity when the expression
at issue has “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 256
Further, under the “speech integral to a crime” category of unprotected
speech, not all speech is treated equally—often the determination of whether
advocacy of crime is protected is based on its potential value to noncriminal
listeners.257 Commercial speech also enjoys less protection in part because of its
into a home without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body.” (internal citations omitted).).
249. Id.
250. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (stating the totality of the circumstances test considers all relevant factor s).
251. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 287 (illustrating the burden-shifting aspect
of the Mt. Healthy test).
252. See supra Part IV.B. (discussing strict scrutiny).
253. See infra Part VI.A.
254. See infra Part VI.B.
255. Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981,
1002 (May 2016).
256. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (creating an exception to obscenity when the expression has
“serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
257. Volokh, supra note 255, at 1002–03.
We see that in the Court’s libel test. We see it in the obscenity test. And we see it in the decisions
under the “integral part of unlawful conduct” exception. Whether speech that is connected to
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“low value.”258 Conversely, the Supreme Court decided that “speech about
matters of public concern . . . is perched at the top of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values, meriting special protection.” 259
Looking at the value of speech on a spectrum, the arrest of a protestor
requires more judicial skepticism, and thus a greater showing of legitimate police
motives, than an arrest based on obscenity or commercial speech because of the
First Amendment preference for wide-open debate on public issues.260 Despite its
reluctance to place a value on speech, the Court has shown the capacity to do so
when necessary and should do so in the context of retaliatory arrests. 261
B. Tempering the Role of Probable Cause and the Fourth Amendment
Officers enjoy great discretion to make arrests. 262 Part of that discretion
includes choosing not to make an arrest. 263 For example, officers may decide not
to make arrests based on limited numbers of available police, prosecutors, courts,
and jails.264 Officers may also determine that the circumstances of a specific case
do not warrant enforcement. 265 Indeed, police officers “virtually always have an
array of options when faced with criminality.” 266
Although the Supreme Court rejected a “reasonable officer standard” in
Whren, such a test may be necessary in a retaliatory arrest claim because the
primary goal of the claim is to root out pretext. 267 Applying a reasonable officer
standard to Allen v. Cisneros as an example, the defendant would need to show
not only that a reasonable officer would have enforced the city ordinance
prohibiting demonstrators from carrying objects greater than three-quarters of an
inch thick, but also that the reasonable officer would have arrested the street

unlawful conduct can be punished turns on how valuable the speech is. Much advocacy of crime is
protected because of its potential value to noncriminal listeners, despite its tendency to cause crime
by some other listeners. Much offensive speech to the public is protected because of its potential
value to willing listeners, despite its tendency to cause some offended listeners to criminally attack
the speaker. And much publication of illegally created, intercepted, or leaked material is protected
because of its potential value to listeners, despite its tendency to stimulate such illegality in the
future.
Id.
258. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980).
259. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011).
260. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
261. Volokh, supra note 255, at 1002.
262. See supra Part. III.A (delineating how Fourth Amendment precedent developed to give officers
considerable discretion making arrests).
263. NEIL P. COHEN, STANLEY E. ADELMAN & LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 28 (4th ed.).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Howard, supra note 10, at 611.
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preacher for carrying a shofar in violation of that ordinance. 268
The reasonable officer standard could counterbalance the “value of speech”
analysis in the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 269 Because the street preacher in
Allen was protesting and lawfully filming police conduct, for instance, a totalityof-the-circumstances test would require a more compelling showing by the
officer that his actions were reasonable. 270
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court cemented the no-probable-cause requirement
for retaliatory prosecution claims, 271 the Court has not ruled on whether that
requirement applies to retaliatory arrests.272 Amid the Court’s silence, many
lower courts follow suit by avoiding the issue, 273 but the majority of courts that
choose to resolve the question have extended the no-probable-cause requirement
to retaliatory arrests.274 This trend should be reversed because requiring
plaintiffs—the alleged victims—to plead and prove a lack of probable cause to
bring a retaliatory arrest claim gives officers the capacity to instantly and
completely silence a speaker without any judicial oversight. 275
Neither First Amendment analysis, Fourth Amendment analysis, the
Hartman rule, nor the Mt. Healthy test successfully juggle the constitutional
concerns at play in a retaliatory arrest. 276 A totality-of-the-circumstances test has
the dexterity to account for all relevant concerns. 277 Although courts dislike
judging the value of speech on a sliding scale, just as courts dislike requiring
officers to perform mental balancing tests on the scene, both tasks may be a
necessary compromise to properly balance the First Amendment and Fourth
Amendment issues at stake in a retaliatory arrest case. 278

268. See generally Allen, 815 F.3d 239 (describing the factual circumstances of a particular retaliatory
arrest claim).
269. See supra Part VI.A (noting that the Supreme Court disfavors valuating speech, despite having the
ability to consider the value of speech in First Amendment analysis).
270. See supra Part VI.A (discussing that political speech, such as a protest, has the highest value and
protection in First Amendment jurisprudence).
271. See supra Part II.A (detailing Hartman’s effect of creating a no-probable-cause requirement for
retaliatory prosecutions).
272. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the circuit split as to whether Hartman’s rule extends to arrests).
273. See supra Part II.B (noting that some courts have not addressed the issue of retaliatory arrests).
274. See supra Part II.B (stating the majority of courts impose a no-probable-cause requirement for
retaliatory arrest claims).
275. See supra Part IV.B (delineating the chilling effect of First Amendment violations).
276. See supra Part V (discussing the deficiencies of the jurisprudence relevant to retaliatory arrests).
277. See supra Part VI (describing how a totality-of-the-circumstances test would function if applied to a
retaliatory arrest claim).
278. See supra Part VI (analyzing the First and Fourth Amendment concerns at play in a retaliatory arrest
claim and suggesting a way to balance those concerns).
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